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Rhetoric and Reality in the
ABA Standards
Linda L. Berger
Language creates the reality it describes.1
—Desmond Tutu, Excerpt from Bill Moyers’ Conversation with Archbishop Tutu, Apr. 27,
1999, PBS (Dec. 28, 2007)
The language of the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards governing
the approval of law schools reﬂects and creates “how things are” in legal
education. Looking at the language of the ABA Standards on faculty and
curricula, it’s clear that the Standards reﬂect and create hierarchy. Nothing
demonstrates this as well as the former Interpretation 402-1, which declared
that only a tenure-track faculty member would count as “one” full faculty
member while “additional teaching resources” would be counted as “less than
one.”2
What set of beliefs and values could justify explicit subordination of some
categories of law school professors based on the subject matter of their courses
or the method of their teaching? For that matter, what beliefs and values could
justify the implicit devaluation found elsewhere in the Standards of clinical and
legal writing courses? Nowhere in the Standards or their legislative history are
these beliefs and values set forth. They appear to go without saying, rationales
unstated, assumptions unexplained.
Equally clear from rhetorical analysis of the language of the Standards
is that they reﬂect and reinforce a set of ideological commitments. As an
example, let’s focus on the Standards’ conﬂuence with neoliberal philosophy.
Linda L. Berger is Family Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
William S. Boyd School of Law.
1.

Desmond Tutu, Excerpt from Bill Moyers’ Conversation with Archbishop Tutu, Apr. 27, 1999, PBS (Dec.
28, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/12282007/transcript2.html [https://perma.
cc/BV79-CQEE].

2.

Some legal writing and clinical professors beneﬁted from the interpretation because
it encouraged law schools to put these professors on the tenure track so they could
be counted as “one.” The provision was removed in 2014. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of
Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Explanation of Changes from 2014 Comprehensive
Review of the Standards, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_
resolutions/201408_explanation_changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJL6-NE57].
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In the neoliberal view, the meritorious rise to the top. Those at the top are
by deﬁnition deserving, and no further explanation or justiﬁcation need be
oﬀered. If, on the other hand, individuals or groups occupy a lower rung, or
could be considered outsiders or outliers, even well-documented arguments
may be insuﬃcient to justify their worth.3
If we confronted similar circumstances outside the law school setting,
we would critique the resulting regulatory system. Based on largely hidden
and therefore unexamined assumptions, it makes subordination natural and
inevitable. Faced with similar conclusions elsewhere, we would demand full
protections and equal rights for those in the resulting marginalized categories.
As law professors committed to equal justice and full citizenship throughout
society, we have an obligation to do no less at home. Timely amendment of the
ABA Standards appears unlikely. As a result, the policy statement published
in this issue of the Journal of Legal Education and setting forth “best practices”
for protecting the rights of those with Standard 405(c) status4 provides one
of our most powerful options, serving as an essential bridge for individual
law faculties and law schools motivated to equalize protections and rights
themselves.
This brief rhetorical analysis grows out of the work of Sonja Foss and other
contemporary rhetoricians who sought to uncover ideological commitments
through analysis of rhetorical structures, strategies, and language uses. As
Foss notes, to remain dominant, governing ideological commitments “must
be constructed, renewed, reinforced, and defended continually through the
use of rhetorical strategies and practices.”5 When the project is successful, the
“dominant ideology controls what participants see as natural or obvious by
establishing the norm. . . . [and] provides a sense that things are the way they
have to be as it asserts that its meanings are the real, natural ones.”6
How do the ABA Standards accomplish this? The Standards combine
the rhetorical structure of hierarchical categories (dividing law faculty and
curricula along subject matter lines, which results in analogous divisions along
the lines of teaching methods) with the rhetorical strategy of assuming the
conclusion (supporting the privileges accorded to what everyone already knows,
no explanation needed) and supporting language choices (establishing
traditional prototypes of faculty and “substantive” law and labeling everybody and
3.

See, e.g., Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 4, 2014, at 71 (2015) (Neoliberalism “redeﬁnes equality as equal choice (or equal amounts
of entrepreneurial liberty) and places any failures in that arena ﬁrmly with the individual.
One’s choices are restricted by one’s own merit and by one’s prior choices, not by systemic
or structural inequalities.”). Id. at 93.

4.

See Melissa Weresh, Best Practices for Protecting Security of Position for 405(c) Faculty, 66 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 538 (2017); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N,
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2016–2017, at 29
(2016) [hereinafter 2016–17 ABA STANDARDS].

5.

SONJA K. FOSS, RHETORICAL CRITICISM: EXPLORATION & PRACTICE 210 (4th ed. 2009).

6.

Id.
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everything else as others). Together, these structures, strategies, and language
choices ensure that no one will mistake the faculty and courses that constitute
the “norm” of legal education, further propping up their legitimacy.
To begin with Chapter 4, Standard 401 establishes a minimum standard for
faculty qualiﬁcations: “A law school shall have a faculty whose qualiﬁcations
and experience enable the law school to operate in compliance with the
Standards and carry out its program of legal education.”7 In order to meet that
standard, “[t]he faculty shall possess a high degree of competence, as demonstrated
by academic qualiﬁcation, experience in teaching or practice, teaching eﬀectiveness, and
scholarship.”8 Consistent with the rhetorical strategy of assuming the conclusion,
nothing more than this is necessary because ABA site team inspectors are the
kind of experts—primarily other law school faculty members—who already
know what everybody knows about what constitutes a competent faculty.9
When it comes to protecting job security and academic freedom, Standard
405(a) requires law schools to “establish and maintain conditions adequate
to attract and retain a competent faculty.”10 Standard 405(b) speciﬁes that a
law school must “have an established and announced policy with respect to
academic freedom and tenure.”11 Read together, these Standards might be
construed to mandate a uniform policy of academic freedom and tenure for all
of a law school’s faculty members.
But that is not the reading the Standards support. By establishing
additional and lesser categories, the ABA lets us know that the requirement
of an established and announced policy on academic freedom and tenure
applies only to the category of faculty members whose membership need not
be delineated because it is a category that everybody already knows—those who, by
tradition, have been hired on the tenure track. By conveying the impression
that this understanding is so widely shared that it need not be stated, the
rhetorical choice reinforces the remarkable assumption that all other faculty
members are so diﬀerent that they require at least three additional categories.12
That the resulting categories reﬂect and create hierarchy is demonstrated
ﬁrst by the ABA’s conﬁdence that everyone will understand who is entitled
to protection of their academic freedom through tenure. Moreover, not only
7.

2016–17 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 27.

8.

Id. When italics are used within quotations from the Standards, the emphasis has been
added.

9.

For conﬁrmation that everybody knows the characteristics most in demand when hiring law
school faculty members, see, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., How to Become a Law School Professor, SSRN
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376549.

10.

2016–17 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 29.

11.

Id.

12.

The categories include tenure-track faculty (405(b)); clinical faculty (405(c)); legal writing
faculty (405(d)); and short-term clinical and legal writing faculty in some circumstances
(405(c) & Interpretation 405–9). Id. at 29–30.
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is it unnecessary to label or describe the category accorded such fundamental
protection, it is unnecessary as well to deﬁne, describe, or detail what this
essential policy must contain. The Standards say only that there must be a
“policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure” and that it must be
established and announced.
Through their language, the Standards reveal and enforce consensus: The
protections and rights bestowed on those who fall within the top level of the
hierarchy accrue so naturally that they need not be spelled out. As we descend
in the hierarchy, more detailed descriptions will inevitably become necessary
in order to assure less protection. For full-time clinical faculty members, it
is suﬃcient for law schools to provide “reasonably similar” protections and
rights.13 For legal writing faculty, law schools need only oﬀer the protections
and rights that “may be necessary” to attract and retain a qualiﬁed faculty
and “safeguard academic freedom.”14 In both instances, unlike the rights and
protections that attach automatically and without question to the top tier, the
ABA conﬁrms the lesser status of the rights and protections aﬀorded to the
lesser categories by describing in some detail the least that law schools must
do.15
Linking faculty status with the privileges accorded to the courses they
teach, the ABA Standards maintain curricular hierarchies as well. In Chapter
3, curricular requirements are spelled out. Until the adoption of “learning
outcomes” in 2014, the curricular requirements began with this one: “(a) A
law school shall require that each student receive substantial instruction in:
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to eﬀective and responsible
participation in the legal profession.”16 Mirroring the implicit message that
norms need little explanation (and no regulation), the Standards ventured
neither a deﬁnition of what constitutes “substantive” law nor a description of
what courses are generally regarded as necessary.
Because they set the “standards for approval of law schools,” we assume
a connection between the Standards and the goal of assuring that law
schools provide eﬀective and appropriate legal education. Moreover, because
the Standards establish norms, they suggest a real, natural, and obvious
connection between merit and “normal” faculty and between quality and
“normal” courses.
Beyond this network of implied associations, Chapter 4 explicitly names
who’s in and who’s out. Faculty at the top are referred to simply as “faculty,”
13.

Id. at 29 (Standard 405(c)).

14.

Id. (Standard 405(d)).

15.

Id. at 29-30 (Interpretations 405–3, 405–6, 405–7, 405–8).

16.

AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2013–2014, at 21 (2013). In place
of the language cited in the text, the amended Standard 302 mandates that a law school
establish learning outcomes that include competency in “[k]nowledge and understanding
of substantive and procedural law.” 2016–17 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at 15.
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while those who fall into the lesser categories are known either as “clinical
faculty members” or “legal writing teachers.” (The ABA recently discarded
even more explicitly hierarchical labels once attached to those who teach legal
writing: “instructors” and “other teaching resources.”) As always, language
choices matter: Labels like these make the resulting categories appear to be
“found, not made,” preexisting and warranted, not created and perpetuated
by the Standards themselves.
Throughout the legislative-regulatory process that shaped the ABA
Standards governing law schools, the authors responded from time to time to
arguments against hierarchies and to other dissenting voices. They recognized
ﬁrst clinical and then legal writing professors as deserving of protection
for academic freedom and some form of job security. And although I have
elsewhere concluded that the rhetorical eﬀects of the detailed descriptions
included in Standard 405(c) appear to reinforce the hierarchical nature of the
created categories, I recognize that provisions spelling out what constitutes
reasonably similar protections for clinical professors might in fact be used to
assure the kind of “substantive equality” necessary to account for and protect
genuine diﬀerences among diﬀerent kinds of faculty.17
Still, the rhetoric of Chapters 3 and 4 of the ABA Standards creates,
maintains, and perpetuates hierarchies. Those hierarchies subordinate some
categories of faculty members and the courses they teach. Without change
in the Standards or their implementation, these hierarchies will remain, and
the values and norms of traditionally privileged faculty and subject matters
will become even more ﬁrmly embedded as representing the best of the
legal academy. By adopting the 405(c) “best practices” policy statement,18
individual law schools and law faculties take upon themselves the power to
demonstrate that the ABA Standards are the ﬂoor, not the ceiling, and that
legal education’s essential values and norms include robust protection of job
security and academic freedom for all law professors.

17.

Linda L. Berger, When Less is More: An Ideological Rhetorical Analysis of Selected ABA Standards on
Curricula and Faculty, in THE DOCTRINE/SKILLS DIVIDE: LEGAL EDUCATION’S SELF-INFLICTED
WOUND (Linda H. Edwards ed., forthcoming August 2017).

18.

Weresh, supra note 4.

